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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of 
non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance 
against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on 
purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended 
resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. 
In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no 
communication up to 25-37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after 
the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can 
observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for 
transgression. 
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1. Communication, Collective Resistance, and Leader Transgression 
This paper introduces the laboratory collective resistance (hereafter CR) game to 
investigate how communication between “responders” can facilitate their collective resistance 
against a leader who transgresses against their rights or personal interests. Our main goal is to 
introduce and evaluate the hypothesis that when social preferences are important in motivating 
the behavior of some of the “beneficiaries” of transgression in the laboratory CR game, 
communication between responders can facilitate collective resistance and deter leader 
transgression. This can occur even when an analysis based on pure-self interest predicts that 
communication should not affect the incidence of transgression in this game.  
A recent theme in both political economy (e.g., Weingast, 1995, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 
2004) and organizational economics (e.g., Williamson, 1985;  Miller, 1992) is that opportunistic 
transgression by the leader—for example, confiscation of citizens’ assets, or unilateral alteration 
of fiscal arrangements between the headquarter and divisions—can have significant negative 
effects on societies and organizations. Furthermore, several recent contributions on the political 
economy of leader transgression emphasize that the extent to which the subordinates can solve 
the coordination problem they face is crucial in determining whether transgression will take 
place. In his influential work, Weingast (1995, 1997, 2005) demonstrates how the state can use a 
“divide-and-conquer” strategy to prevent coordinated resistance, by sharing some of the 
confiscated surplus with a subset of subordinates. Acemoglu et al. (2004) also emphasize the 
importance of the divide-and-conquer strategy, and derive further predictions regarding the 
conditions under which the ruler can use this strategy to extract surplus from subjects.   
Our experiment is based on the game-theoretic model of divide-and-conquer 
transgression developed by Weingast (1995, 1997) (which he originally refers to as the   3
Sovereign-Constituency Transgression game). We first start with the Basic CR game illustrated 
in Figure 1 (Weingast, 1997). This game captures the following ideas. First, successful 
transgression allows the leader to extract surplus from the responders and increases the leader’s 
private payoff, even though it reduces total surplus because some of the surplus is destroyed in 
the process. In the Figure 1 payoffs, for example, successful transgression against both 
responders reduces each responder’s payoff by 6 (so 12 in total) but only increases the leader’s 
payoff by 6, since the transgression destroys half of the confiscated surplus. Second, challenging 
is costly to the responders regardless of whether or not it succeeds, and the responders face a 
coordination problem in deciding whether to challenge the leader. In particular, the leader will be 
deposed of power if and only if both responders incur the cost to challenge him. Third, multiple 
equilibria exist in the top “transgression subgame” in which the leader transgresses against both 
responders. Both responders challenging the leader and both responders acquiescing are possible 
equilibria, so this subgame is an assurance (also known as a “stag hunt”) game under standard 
money-maximizing preferences.  
In the bottom “no transgression” subgame, acquiesce is a dominant strategy for both 
responders. Because both (challenge, challenge) and (acquiesce, acquiesce) are Nash equilibria 
in the transgression subgame, the overall Basic CR game has two subgame perfect equilibrium.   
In one equilibrium, the leader expects that the responders will both acquiesce in the transgression 
subgame, and he will transgress. In the other equilibrium, the leader expects that the responders 
can succeed in coordinating on the “challenge” Nash equilibrium in the transgression subgame, 
and he will not transgress. Importantly, in this Basic CR game, the surplus-maximizing outcome 
without transgression can be supported as an equilibrium.
2  
                                                 
2 Besides the two pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria, there is also another subgame perfect equilibrium in 
which the two responders acquiesce with probability 5/6 in the transgression subgame and always acquiesce in the   4
As Weingast points out, besides transgressing against both responders, the leader can also 
use a divide-and-conquer strategy. Figure 2 illustrates the Divide-and Conquer CR game 
(hereafter we shall refer to this game as the CR game, and the Figure 1 game without the Divide-
and Conquer (hereafter DAC) option as the Basic CR game). In this example, when the leader 
transgresses against only one responder he shares 1 of the 3 units of the confiscated surplus with 
the other responder as an attempt to gain her support. Importantly, when the leader can use a 
DAC strategy, the outcome of “no transgression against any responder” cannot be supported as 
part of an equilibrium in this game. To see why, first note that if the leader expects that a 
transgression against both responders will be met with coordinated challenge, then he will refrain 
from such transgression. However, when the leader transgresses against only one responder, the 
beneficiary of the transgression will not challenge the transgression because supporting the 
transgression increases his material payoff. Knowing this, the victim will not incur the cost to 
challenge the leader. Hence, successful resistance against DAC transgression will never occur.  
These observations imply that this game has three (pure strategy) equilibria. In one 
equilibrium, the leader transgresses against both responders, expecting that this transgression 
will not be met by coordinated resistance. In each of the other two equilibria, the leader practices 
DAC transgression against one of the responders, expecting that no responder will challenge 
him.
3 Furthermore, because the beneficiary has no incentive to challenge the transgression, 
                                                                                                                                                             
no transgression subgame, and the leader transgresses against the responders. Because allowing for the possibility of 
mixed-strategy equilibrium does not change the key implications of the Basic CR game and the Divide-and Conquer 
CR game, we shall focus on pure-strategy equilibria in the text.  
3 The conclusion that responders will not challenge a DAC transgression, so that no transgression cannot be 
supported as an equilibrium, always holds whenever agents seek to maximize a utility function that only depends on 
and is increasing in their own monetary payoff. Moreover, given the chosen parameter values, introducing simple 
inequity aversion, such as that captured in Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) well-known model, does not affect the 
beneficiaries’ dominant strategy to acquiesce in this DAC CR game. A beneficiary challenging a transgression 
reduces the disutility from earning more than the transgression victim. But he also reduces his material payoff and 
increases his disutility from earning more than the leader when the resistance succeeds. Therefore, acquiescing 
remains a dominant strategy for the beneficiary. Furthermore, one can show that this implies that a leader with   5
allowing for non-binding communication between the beneficiary and the victim in the one-shot 
CR game will not change the conclusion that collective resistance against DAC transgression 
will not occur in equilibrium. Hence, such communication will not change the prediction that no 
transgression cannot be supported as an equilibrium.
4 
This conclusion, however, can change significantly if a possibility exists that the 
beneficiary may be motivated by concerns other than narrow self-interest. Recent contributions 
on social preferences (see, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Gintis, et al., 2005 and the 
references cited there) emphasize that some individuals may be altruistic punishers, who are 
willing to incur the cost to punish a violation of social norms, even when they are not directly 
hurt by such violations, and even when there is no significant scope for repeated interactions.
5 In 
the CR game, suppose the beneficiary is an altruistic punisher and regards transgression by the 
leader as socially unacceptable, and therefore is willing to incur personal costs to engage in 
altruistic punishment against the leader.
6 If the victim knows that the beneficiary is willing to do 
so, then the victim will also incur the cost to resist transgression. These observations suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                             
inequity aversion still prefers DAC transgression to no transgression. Therefore, incorporating inequity aversion 
does not change the conclusion that “no transgression against any responder” cannot be supported as part of an 
equilibrium.  Inequity aversion could change the set of equilibria for other payoff parameters, however, such as the 
lower leader payoffs used in Weingast’s (1997) original version of the game. 
4 A small number of laboratory studies have investigated how a first-mover can expropriate surplus from a 
responder, such as the Peasant-Dictator game studied by Van Huyck et al. (1995) and the Power-to-Take game 
studied by Bosman and Van Winden (2002). However, in these studies there is only a single responder (which can 
be an individual or a team of individuals), so the issue of DAC transgression and coordinated resistance between two 
responders does not arise.   
5 For example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) consider a one-shot dictator game in which A allocates a fixed amount 
between herself and B. A third party, whose material payoff is not affected by the proposed allocation by A, then 
can choose whether to incur the cost to punish A for making an unfair allocation. They find that most third parties 
punished dictators who took more than half of the surplus.  
6 Different considerations may be responsible for why some beneficiaries may consider the divide-and-conquer 
transgression to be undesirable even though it increases their material payoffs.  A beneficiary may identify with the 
welfare of the victim, or he may have concerns about social welfare (Charness and Rabin, 2002) and disapproves the 
transgression because it reduces total surplus. Our experiment is not designed to differentiate between these different 
social motivations in affecting behavior in the CR game.  As a first attempt to study the role of social preferences in 
collective resistance and transgression, we aim at finding out empirically whether and how communication can 
affect behavior in the CR game when the pure self-interest model predicts that it should not. If communication does 
affect behavior, then this result and our findings will provide justification for further work aiming at understanding 
the relative importance of different motivations in affecting behavior in the CR game.    6
some successful collective resistance against DAC transgression can actually occur in 
equilibrium when social preferences are present. Furthermore, non-binding communication, by 
providing the opportunity for the responders to signal their “types” to others, can alter behavior 
and deter transgression.   
Motivated by these observations, this study investigates the effects of various restrictive 
communication on the one-shot CR games.
7 Responder subjects could send binary messages that 
indicate their intended actions among available options in the CR game.  
In our experiment, we first investigate whether Ex Post Communication may facilitate 
collective resistance. In this treatment, after they observe the choice made by the leader but 
before  they make their actual choices, the responders indicate to each other their intended 
choices in non-binding communication. The leader does not observe these messages. 
We also investigate the effect of Public Ex Ante Communication on resistance and 
transgression. In this treatment, the responders indicated to each other an intended play for every 
subgame, and these intentions were observed by the leader prior to the leader’s decision.
8 While 
responders only communicate their intended choices in the subgame actually chosen by the 
leader in the Ex Post Communication, Public Ex Ante Communication allows the responders to 
observe the intentions communicated in all subgames before the leader’s choice. Furthermore, 
Public Ex Ante Communication also allows for the possibility that observing the communicated 
intentions may affect the leader’s behavior. We also consider the case of Private Ex Ante 
                                                 
7 We focus on one-shot game to abstract from the possibility that the prospect of repeated interactions may motivate 
the beneficiary to resist DAC transgression. Of course, reputational considerations associated with repeated 
interactions can be important in deterring leader transgression. This idea has been emphasized by many scholars 
(see, for example, Weingast, 1997; and Gibbons, 2001). Van Huyck et al. (2001) report a laboratory study of 
confiscation with repeated interactions between a dictator and a single citizen. (This is compared to the case where 
the dictator can commit to a particular allocation in Van Huyck et al., 1995.) In Cason and Mui (in preparation) we 
investigate how different kinds of repeated interactions affect the incidence of transgression and resistance. 
8 Note that these intentions were not binding, however, so ex ante communication does not elicit actual decisions 
using the strategy method.   7
Communication, which differs from Public Ex Ante Communication in only one way: the 
intentions expressed by the responders are not observed by the leader. A comparison of Private 
and Public Ex Ante Communication shows that whether the leader can base his transgression 
decision on the responders’ intentions turns out to be critical in affecting the efficacy of 
communication.  
 
2. Experimental  Design     
  This study consists of 36 independent sessions across five different treatments, as 
summarized in Table 1, involving the participation of 324 separate human subjects who 
participated in the sessions conducted at two universities. All subjects were inexperienced in the 
sense that they participated in only one session of this study, although some had participated in 
other economics experiments that were completely unrelated to this research project. 
The No Communication treatments serve as baselines to evaluate the impacts of 
alternative forms of communication. In the Basic CR game, even without communication, 
transgressions were almost uniformly met with coordinated resistance and so transgressions did 
not occur after the first few periods. Therefore we chose to concentrate the data collection for 
various communication treatments on the (Divide-and-Conquer) CR game. 
The experiment instructions employed neutral terminology. For example, “Person 1” 
chose “earnings square” A, B, C or D—which was the transgression decision—and then 
“Persons 2 and 3” simultaneously selected either X or Y—which was the challenge decision. (Ex 
Post Communication instructions are in the appendix.) In the communication treatments the 
responders send a restrictive message to the other responder in their group: an “intended” choice 
(either X or Y), prior to committing to an actual challenge or acquiesce decision.    8
As explained in the previous section, the communication treatments differ in both the 
timing and in who observes the messages that are exchanged. In the Ex Post and the Private Ex 
Ante Communication treatments, only the two responders who are exchanging the messages 
observe the message content. In the Public Ex Ante treatment, the leader also observes the 
messages. In the Ex Post treatment, the responders first learn the transgression choice of the 
leader and then exchange messages for only the subgame chosen by the leader. In the Ex Ante 
treatments, the responders indicate an intended choice for all four possible transgression 
subgames. These binary messages were exchanged simultaneously; that is, a responder did not 
learn the other responder’s message(s) until completely specifying all of her message(s). 
Each session had nine participants, but two sessions were always conducted 
simultaneously so 18 subjects were present in the lab for each data collection period. The 
instructions emphasized that subjects were randomly re-grouped each period. The regrouping 
occurred separately within the two groups of nine subjects in the lab, although this was not 
mentioned in the instructions. Subject roles remained fixed: leaders always remained leaders, and 
responders always remained responders. All sessions were planned for 50 periods, but some of 
the Ex Ante Communication sessions did not complete all 50 periods because they ran slowly 
and the time period allocated for the session expired. 
Subjects’ earnings were designated in “experimental francs.” They were paid for all 
periods, and their cumulative francs balance was converted to either Australian or U.S. dollars at 
exchange rates that resulted in earnings that considerably exceeded their opportunity costs. The 
per-person earnings typically ranged between US$25 and US$40 for the Purdue sessions and 
between A$30 and A$60 for the Monash sessions.
9 Exchange rates were chosen before 
                                                 
9 The exchange rate between U.S. and Australian dollars was approximately 1 AUD = 0.75 USD when the 
experiment was conducted.   9
beginning data collection based on the time required to complete pilot sessions. Sessions without 
communication ran more quickly—some as short at 75 minutes including instructions—while 
those with communication typically required 1.5 to 2.5 hours. We employed more generous 
conversion rates for the longer sessions to compensate subjects for the longer time in the lab. 
 
3. Results 
3.1  Basic Collective Resistance Game 
In the Basic CR game (cf Figure 1) the leader can only transgress against both responders 
or transgress against neither, and so no transgression can be supported as an equilibrium. While 
leaders transgress about 30 percent of the time during the first 10 periods, they quickly learn that 
this is unprofitable. The responders play an assurance (stag hunt) game in the transgression 
against both subgame, but they clearly coordinate to both challenge despite the existence of 
multiple equilibria. Responders challenge 126 out of 128 times they face transgression, 
successfully resisting 62 of the 64 transgressions. Only 14 out of the 360 leader choices in the 
final 30 periods were for transgression.
10 
3.2  Divide- and-Conquer Collective Resistance Game without Communication 
Adding the divide- and-conquer (DAC) option to the CR game (cf Figure 2) changes the 
set of equilibria compared to the Basic CR game, and under purely self-regarding preferences the 
outcome of no transgression cannot be supported as an equilibrium when DAC is possible. 
Furthermore, even if some beneficiaries are altruistic punishers, collective resistance may be 
unlikely to occur without mechanisms that allow responders to signal their types to one another. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
10 This result is also not surprising, since challenge is a best response for this subgame whenever a responder 
believes that the other responder will challenge with a probability that exceeds 1/6. See Battalio et al. (2001) for a 
thorough experimental analysis of stag hunt games with differing optimization incentives.   10
H1: The no transgression outcome occurs less frequently in the DAC CR game than in the 
Basic CR game. 
The data clearly provide strong support for this hypothesis. The no transgression rate is 
high and rises across periods in the Basic CR game, and is much lower and declines across 
periods in the DAC CR game. During the final half of the sessions, the no transgression rate is 
above 90 percent in the Basic CR game and is less than 10 percent in the DAC CR game. The 
differences in these rates are highly statistically significant for any time period (Mann-Whitney 
U=0 for sample sizes n=8, m=4; p-value<0.01). 
Leaders most frequently choose the DAC option in this game without communication, 
and they select this strategy at a rate that rises smoothly from 73 percent in periods 1-10 to 94 
percent in periods 41-50.
11 Transgressions against both responders are frequently resisted, as in 
the Basic CR game.
12 Figure 3 shows that successful resistance to DAC transgressions is much 
less common. Recall that the beneficiary of a DAC transgression who is self-regarding has a 
dominant strategy to acquiesce. The beneficiary’s challenge rate begins below 25 percent and 
falls over time. Victims challenge at a higher rate, but their challenges are usually unsuccessful 
and so this rate also falls over time. In the final 10 periods the rate of successful joint resistance 
falls below 4 percent, and after period 20 the expected payoff for the leader of a DAC 
transgression exceeds the payoff of 6 for no transgression. 
                                                 
11 Social preferences that reflect positive concern for the responders’ payoffs or for efficiency do not seem to play a 
significant role in affecting leaders’ behavior in this DAC CR game, since they chose the no transgression option 
rarely during the initial periods of the experiment. Across all treatments (including communication) for the DAC CR 
game, 73 out of 96 leaders (76 percent) chose no transgression zero or one time during the first 5 periods of their 
session. Only 10 out of 96 leaders (10 percent) chose no transgression 3 or more times in these initial 5 periods. It is 
worth noting that for the payoff parameters implemented in this CR game, even if the leader has the kind of inequity 
aversion posited by Fehr and Schmidt, she always prefers DAC transgression to no transgression for any parameters 
(suitably restricted by Fehr and Schmidt) regarding her aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequity as 
long as she expects that the responders will not resist. 
12 In the DAC CR game without communication, responders challenge 109 out of 134 transgressions against both 
(81 percent), and successful joint resistance occurs in 43 out of 67 of these transgressions (64 percent). The expected 
payoff for the leader from a transgression against both is therefore 4.3.    11
3.3  Communication in the Divide-and-Conquer Collective Resistance Game 
As discussed in the introduction, if some beneficiaries are altruistic punishers, even 
restrictive cheap talk could change outcomes in the DAC CR game because it provides 
opportunities for the responders to signal their types. Our treatments add communication in three 
different ways to thoroughly explore the following principal research hypotheses: 
H2: Communication increases the frequency of the no transgression outcome in the DAC 
CR game. 
H3: Communication increases responder resistance in the DAC subgames. 
Figure 4 presents the time series of rates that the leader chooses no transgression for all 
four treatments with the DAC transgression option available. As noted above, this rate is low and 
declines over time in the treatment without communication. By contrast, the rates rise over time 
or remain relatively stable for the communication treatments, and leaders choose no 
transgression at the highest rate in the Private Ex Ante Communication treatment. The no 
transgression rate does not appear to be higher in the Public Ex Ante Communication treatment, 
however, so the figure provides some initial qualitative support for hypothesis H2 only for two of 
the three communication treatments. 
This figure obscures substantial variation in transgression rates across sessions. Table 2 
displays the rates that leaders chose no transgression after period 20 for the 36 individual 
sessions. The No Communication treatment has many of the lowest rates of no transgression, 
while the Ex Post and Private Ex Ante Communication treatments have some of the highest rates 
of no transgression. Nevertheless, these two communication treatments also have sessions with 
no (or virtually no) leader choices of no transgression. The bottom of Table 2 indicates that the 
lower transgression rate in these communication treatments led to modestly higher efficiency.   12
Ex Post Communication 
Hypotheses H2 and H3 receive statistical support for the Ex Post Communication 
treatment. A Mann-Whitney test indicates that Ex Post Communication increases the frequency 
relative to the No Communication baseline (U=10,  n=m=8;  p-value=0.01), supporting 
Hypothesis H2.
13 Figure 3 shows that successful joint resistance in the DAC subgame averages 
only 7 percent in periods 21-50 with no communication. The data (not shown in Figure 3) 
indicate, however, that successful joint resistance does not fall substantially over time with Ex 
Post Communication, and is over twice as high (15 percent) in periods 21-50. This increase in 
resistance is marginally statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U=19, n=m=8; p-value=0.086), 
providing some support for Hypothesis H3. 
Although these results indicate that Ex Post Communication does matter, it only leads to 
a modest reduction in transgression. This is perhaps because subjects often fail to follow through 
on the “intended” choices indicated in their cheap talk. In the Ex Post Communication treatment, 
victims of DAC transgressions indicate an intention to challenge about 70 to 75 percent of the 
time during later periods, but they only actually challenge in about 30 to 35 percent of the 
periods. Beneficiaries of DAC transgressions indicate an intention to challenge about 30 to 35 
percent of the time, but they only actually challenge in about 17 percent of the periods.  
Table 3 indicates, however, that communication helps coordinate successful resistance. 
Rows 2 and 3 show that victims and beneficiaries are both much more likely to challenge DAC 
transgression when the beneficiary’s cheap talk message was an intention to challenge. The 
                                                 
13 A drawback of this nonparametric test is that it discards an enormous amount of data when collapsing all the 
information for each session into a single summary statistic. Therefore, to complement the nonparametric tests 
reported in the text we also conducted random effects probit models of the leaders’ transgression decisions that use 
all the data. These models provide similar conclusions to the Mann-Whitney tests, and so to conserve space we do 
not report them in detail. The individual leader subjects are the random effects, and the models include a time trend 
and site dummies to account for any possible systematic variation across subject pools. A dummy variable indicates 
that Ex Post Communication significantly increases the likelihood of the no transgression (t=1.93; one-tailed p-
value=0.027) relative to No Communication.   13
highest challenge and successful resistance rates occur when both responders indicate resistance 
(row 3). The lowest rates occur when neither responder indicates resistance, as shown in row 4.  
Table 4 presents statistical support for the conclusion that both victims and beneficiaries 
choose to challenge a DAC transgression when the beneficiary of the transgression or 
(especially) when both responders indicate that they intend to challenge. The likelihood of actual 
resistance for both victims and beneficiaries, estimated using these fixed effects logit models, is 
always significantly higher when both responders indicate an intention to resist. Intended 
resistance by the beneficiary alone also usually increases the actual resistance probability.  
Ex Ante Communication 
Returning to Table 2, note that Public Ex Ante Communication does not increase the no 
transgression rate relative to the No Communication baseline (Mann-Whitney U=26, n=m=8; 
ns). By contrast, no transgression is most frequent overall in the Private Ex Ante Communication 
treatment, although this treatment also has the greatest variation across sessions. Therefore, the 
increase in no transgression (relative to the no communication baseline) is marginally 
insignificant (U=20, n=m=8; p-value=0.102).
14 Pooling over all 24 sessions that featured any 
communication, this test does reject the null hypothesis that communication does not increase the 
rate of no transgression (Z=1.747, n=8, m=24; p-value=0.040).  
Although the data provide mixed support for Hypothesis H2 in the Ex Ante 
Communication treatments, this support is not accompanied by corresponding support for 
Hypothesis H3. Responder resistance in the DAC subgames is not systematically higher with 
either Ex Ante Communication treatment in the later periods 21-50 (insignificant Mann-Whitney 
                                                 
14 Random effects probit models (described in the previous footnote) provide similar conclusions. Dummy variables 
indicate that the Public Ex Ante Communication treatment is not significantly different from the No Communication 
baseline (t=0.22; ns), and the Private Ex Ante Communication treatment are at the margin of traditional significance 
levels (t=1.56; one-tailed p-value=0.059).   14
U statistics that range from 22 to 43). Nevertheless, examination of session level data does 
indicate a strong relationship between the early (periods 1-20) rates of successful joint resistance 
in a session and late (periods 21-50) leader choices of no transgression in that session. Across the 
24 communication sessions, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.82 between these 
measures is highly significant. The four sessions with the highest early resistance had an average 
late no transgression rate of 0.75, while the ten sessions with the lowest early resistance had an 
average late no transgression rate of 0.06.  
One original motivation for studying Public Ex Ante Communication was based on a 
conjecture that it would provide an opportunity for altruistic punishers to signal their types to 
others, and if this leads to a higher incidence of indicated joint resistance observed by the leader, 
it would deter the leader from transgression.
15 The Private Ex Ante Communication treatment 
serves as a useful comparison for examining how the observability of the intentions by the leader 
may change behavior. Our conjecture that Public Ex Ante Communication may deter 
transgression turned out to be wrong, and a comparison between the Public and Private Ex Ante 
Communication treatments shows why. When the intentions are observed by the leader, 
responders are reluctant to indicate an intention to challenge as a beneficiary. This undermines 
the effectiveness of Public Ex Ante Communication in deterring transgression. 
Tables 3 and 4 provide strong evidence that coordinated resistance to a DAC 
transgression is much more successful when the beneficiary indicates an intention to challenge. 
                                                 
15 Another motivation, for both Ex Ante Communication treatments, was to examine whether intentions 
communicated for subgames not chosen by the leader may still provide a responder with useful information about 
the type of the other responder, and hence may affect resistance behavior. We explored how the intentions for other 
subgames not chosen influence resistance rates in the subgame actually chosen by the leader. The results were 
mixed. For example, we included indicator variables for victim and beneficiary intended resistance in the DAC 
transgression subgame not chosen in alternative specifications for the logit resistance models shown in Table 4. If 
the actual victim had indicated an intention to resist as a beneficiary in the other DAC transgression (not chosen by 
the leader) in which the actual beneficiary is a victim, the point estimates always suggest that the actual beneficiary 
is more likely to resist. This increase in resistance likelihood, however, is only marginally significant in some cases.   15
In the Ex Ante Communication treatments the rate of successful joint resistance is less than 4 
percent when only the victim or neither responder indicated an intention to resist, but it is as high 
as 29 to 39 percent when only the beneficiary or both responders indicated an intention to resist. 
This suggests that leaders might use the Public Ex Ante messages to identify which responder 
they could successfully transgress against. Figure 5 provides support for this conjecture. It 
displays the five most common messages observed by the leader for DAC subgames for this 
treatment. The Type B and Type D cases are situations in which both responders indicate an 
intention to challenge a transgression against a particular responder (denoted X), while 
transgressions against the other responder (here denoted Y) do not have coordinated resistance 
indicated in the intentions. In both of these cases, transgressions against Y are more than ten 
times more frequent than transgressions against X.
16 Also note that leaders are much more likely 
to transgress against neither responder when both responders indicate an intention to challenge 
both DAC transgressions (Type E). This figure shows that indicating an intention to challenge a 
DAC transgression as a beneficiary was quite risky; if the other responder did not also indicate a 
challenge as a beneficiary, this responder was likely to be the victim of a DAC transgression. 
Therefore, even if a beneficiary is an altruistic punisher, he/she may be reluctant to indicate an 
intention to challenge in the Public Ex Ante Communication treatment.  
A comparison of the public and private ex ante messages reveals that responders 
apparently understood how the public messages influenced the leader’s transgression decision, 
and their messages differ significantly when the leaders can observe them. Responders indicated 
an intention to resist as a beneficiary 51 percent of the time in the Private Ex Ante treatment, but 
                                                 
16 A fixed effects logit model (not shown) of the leaders’ decision regarding which responder to transgress against, 
conditional on choosing the DAC transgression, indicates a significantly greater propensity to transgress against Y 
in the Type B (t-statistic=4.46) and Type D (t-statistic=6.29) cases in which joint resistance to a transgression 
against X is indicated in the cheap talk.   16
only 22 percent of the time in the Public Ex Ante treatment (Mann-Whitney U=7.5, n=m=8; p-
value<0.02). The combination of responders’ reluctance to indicate resistance as a beneficiary 
and leaders’ ability to target “weak” responders led to a substantially lower number of DAC 
transgressions in those cases where resistance was most likely—when both responders indicate 
intended resistance: 28 in Public Ex Ante versus 232 in Private Ex Ante (cf Table 3, row 3).
17 To 
summarize these observations for the Public Ex Ante treatment: (1) the leader uses the 
responders’ communicated intentions to pick a vulnerable target for DAC transgression; (2) this 
makes responders reluctant to indicate an intention to challenge as a beneficiary and lowers the 
rate that both responders indicate joint resistance; and (3) the leader practices DAC transgression 
most frequently in the subgame where it is likely to be successful—i.e., when the beneficiary 
does not indicate an intention to resist. This behavioral pattern led to less successful joint 
resistance, and undermined the effectiveness of Public Ex Ante Communication in deterring 
transgression. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance game to investigate the relationship 
between leader transgression and collective resistance, as well as how different forms of non-
binding, restrictive communication between responders may affect the incidence of leader 
transgression and responders’ collective resistance. We find that consistent with Weingast’s 
(1995, 1997) prediction, in the baseline DAC CR game without communication, transgression 
almost always occurs, and it mainly takes the form of DAC transgression. However, while an 
                                                 
17 In the Public Ex Ante treatment, the unconditional rate that both responders indicate resistance to a DAC 
transgression is 17.3 percent. In contrast, in DAC transgressions actually chosen by the leader, the rate that both 
responders indicate resistance is only 3.2 percent. This provides further evidence that the leaders are targeting the 
weak responder and avoid practicing transgression in which both responders indicate an intention to challenge.   17
analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences predicts that non-binding communication 
should have no effect on the incidence of no transgression, we find that in this one-shot 
laboratory DAC CR game, the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no 
communication to 9-37 percent in these three communication treatments. Compared to the no 
communication benchmark, Ex Post Communication significantly increases the incidence of no 
transgression. 
Our results suggest the need for further research that investigates the under-explored 
question of how heterogeneities in preferences among responders may change the nature of the 
coordination problems faced by responders when deciding whether to resist leader transgression, 
and how mechanisms that take into account the importance of social preferences can facilitate 
collective resistance against the abuse of power by political and organizational leaders. As a first 
step to investigate whether social preferences and communication matter in collective resistance, 
we chose to study restrictive communication because it is easier to implement and control, and 
the simplicity of the messages makes it easier to quantify the messages and their impacts on 
behavior. Since restrictive communication only has a modest effect on the incidence of 
transgression, in future studies, we plan to investigate how rich communication, in which 
responders can send free-form “chat” messages to others (e.g., Cooper and Kagel, 2005; 
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), may have stronger effect in the CR game. Rich 
communication can potentially have stronger effects because responders can go beyond merely 
indicating their intended actions, but can also offer justifications for their intentions, and to 
engage in debate regarding what constitutes appropriate behavior in collective resistance. Such 
studies will also enable us to examine the content of the messages sent by the responders to gain 
more direct insights about their motivations.    18
Table 1:  Experimental Design 
 No  Communication  Ex Post 
Communication 
Public Ex Ante 
Communication 





4 Sessions  
(36 Subjects) 
2 at Monash Univ., 
2 at Purdue Univ. 





8 Sessions  
(72 Subjects)
 
6 at Monash Univ., 
2 at Purdue Univ. 
8 Sessions  
(72 Subjects)
 
6 at Monash 
Univ., 2 at 
Purdue Univ. 
8 Sessions  
(72 Subjects)
 
6 at Monash 
Univ., 2 at 
Purdue Univ. 
8 Sessions  
(72 Subjects)
 
4 at Monash 
Univ., 4 at 
Purdue Univ.  
Note: Fifty periods were conducted in all sessions except in the Public Ex Ante treatment. Two 





Table 2: Rates for Independent Sessions that Leaders Transgressed Against Neither 
Responder 






Public Ex Ante 
Communication 
Private Ex Ante 
Communication
(sessions 0.99  0.33  0.62  0.20  1.00 
ordered 0.98  0.10  0.43  0.18  0.71 
highest 0.97  0.09  0.34  0.13  0.67 
to 0.91  0.06  0.22  0.08  0.48 
lowest)     0.02  0.13  0.07   0.06 
     0.00  0.12  0.03   0.01 
     0.00  0.07  0.00   0.01 
     0.00  0.03  0.00   0.00 
Treatment 
Average 0.96  0.07  0.25  0.09  0.37 
Average 
Efficiency
a 98.6% 84.0%  86.4%  84.7%  89.0% 
Note: The early periods 1-20 are excluded from these calculations. 
aEfficiency is defined as the percentage of the maximum aggregate surplus (which corresponds 
to no transgression) realized by subjects. 
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Table 3: Challenge and Successful Resistance for Different Cheap Talk Messages 
























(1)  Only  Victim  114/443 19/443  5/443 214/568 41/568  21/568 81/262  10/262  5/262 
    Indicates  Resistance  25.7% 4.3%  1.1%  37.7% 7.2%  3.7%  30.9% 3.8%  1.9% 
(2)  Only  Beneficiary  31/78 18/78  9/78 26/49 22/49 14/49  33/82  8/82  3/82 
    Indicates  Resistance 39.7% 23.1% 11.5%  53.1% 44.9% 28.6%  40.2%  9.8%  3.7% 
(3) Both  Responders  190/228  117/228  110/228  23/28  12/28  11/28  180/232  77/232  67/232 
    Indicate  Resistance  83.3% 51.3% 48.2%  82.1% 42.9% 39.3%  77.6% 33.2% 28.9% 
(4)  Neither  Responder  20/141  5/141  0/141 59/230  7/230  4/230 20/138  8/138  3/138 
    Indicates  Resistance  14.2% 3.5%  0.0%  25.7% 3.0%  1.7%  14.5% 5.8%  2.2% 
 
Table 4: Fixed Effects Logit Models of DAC Challenge Decision Based on Cheap Talk Messages 
  
          Ex Post  
    Communication 
Public Ex Ante 
Communication 
Private Ex Ante 
Communication 
Cheap Talk: 












Only Victim  0.12  0.07  1.16**  1.64**  0.61
† -0.87 
  Indicates  Resistance (0.35) (0.59) (0.24) (0.56) (0.34) (0.67) 
Only  Beneficiary  1.45**  1.74** 0.91* 3.14**  1.25**  0.69 
  Indicates  Resistance (0.39) (0.61) (0.40) (0.67) (0.38) (0.83) 
Both  Responders  4.01** 3.23** 2.72** 4.22** 2.83**  1.55* 
  Indicate  Resistance  (0.42) (0.59) (0.60) (0.83) (0.37) (0.62) 
1/period  4.19** 2.21* 5.25**  2.42**  3.46**  3.55** 
  (0.83) (0.98) (1.05) (0.86) (0.92) (1.33) 
Log  likelihood  -250.8  -127.7  -329.5 -91.4 -242.4 -85.8 
Observations  855 464 859 354 648 324 
Notes: All models are estimated with subject fixed effects. Some subjects were dropped due to zero variation in challenge decision. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the one-percent level; * denotes significance at the five-percent 
level; 
† denotes significance at the ten-percent level (all two-tailed tests).   20
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Figure 1: The Basic Collective Resistance Game (payoffs are for (Leader, 








Figure 2: The Divide-and-Conquer Collective Resistance Game (payoffs are for (Leader, 






   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce 8,  9,  2  8, 9, 1  Responder A 
Challenge  8, 8, 2  0, 7, 7 
   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce  8, 2, 9  8, 2, 8  Responder A 








   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce  6, 8, 8  6, 8, 7  Responder A 
Challenge  6 ,7, 8  0, 7, 7 
Leader 
   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce  12, 2, 2  12, 2, 1  Responder A 
Challenge  12, 1, 2  0, 7, 7 
Leader 
   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce  12, 2, 2  12, 2, 1  Responder A 
Challenge 12, 1, 2  0, 7, 7
   Responder B 
   Acquiesce Challenge 
Acquiesce  6, 8, 8  6, 8, 7  Responder A 












































DAC CR Game--No Communication
Public Ex Ante Communication
Ex Post Communication
Private Ex Ante Communication
 













Type A: Only victim
to challenge X,
nobody to challenge Y
Type B: Both to
challenge X, nobody
to challenge Y
Type C: Only victim
to challenge X, only
victim to challenge Y
Type D: Both to
challenge X, only
victim to challenge Y
Type E: Both to
challenge X, both to
challenge Y



































Note the much higher transgression 
against Y when joint challenge against 
X is indicated
Highest relative no 
transgression rate when 
all divide-and-conquer 
intentions are to 
 
Figure 5: Leader Transgression Decisions Depending on Responder Public Ex Ante 
Intentions 
 
 